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Free Speech and Press in the Modern
Age: Can 2 0th Century Theory Bear the
Weight of 21st Century Demands?
Introduction
Barry P. McDonald*
As is likely to be the case at the dawn of every new century, at the start
of the twenty-first America is facing new and emerging challenges to its
commitment to freedom of speech and press. At the 2008 PepperdineLaw
Review Symposium, we assembled many of the leading free speech scholars
in this country, as well as distinguished jurists, government officials, and
news media leaders,' to discuss and focus on three of the most prominent.
The first set of challenges is that presented by extremist group speech, and
especially terrorist propaganda, recruiting materials, and operational speech,
as well as the government's responses to them. The second concerns the
challenges presented by modem political campaigns and the mushrooming
solicitations, contributions, and expenditures of money connected with
conducting and participating in them. The third group of problems involves
those engendered by our society's mass migration to digital, and
increasingly interactive, platforms of communication, including the
wrenching changes being experienced by the traditional news media.
Our experts were asked to address whether the free speech doctrines and
theories developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the twentieth century
remained up to the task of striking the proper balance among the competing
interests and values involved in addressing these new challenges of the
modem age. In this special symposium edition of the Pepperdine Law

* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.
1. We are very grateful for the participation in this symposium of then-Los Angeles Times
publisher David Hiller, Chief Judge Alex Kozinski of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, then-Federal Communications Commission Chairman Kevin Martin, and Professors William
Van Alstyne and Eugene Volokh. Although these participants did not submit symposium essays for
publication, they made invaluable contributions to our discussions that both illuminated and
sharpened the important topics which were considered.

Review, we present our scholars' responses. Geoffrey Stone leads off and
builds a remarkable bridge for us to cross sure-footedly into the twenty-first
century by summarizing ten key judgments made by the Court during the
twentieth century that give modem free speech doctrine its essential shape
and substance. 2 Stone suggests that by gradually building that doctrine
using practical experience and common sense judgments, the Court has
equipped us well to face new challenges presented by modem developments.
As he views it, "by the end of the twentieth century the Court... had for the
most part built a sensible and reasonably effective set of principles for
sorting First Amendment
issues and for reaching reasonably sound and
3
predictable outcomes."
Taking on the issue of extremist speech, Fred Schauer, Rodney Smolla
and Nadine Strossen provide valuable and varied perspectives on that
subject. Schauer provides us with an insightful and sobering caution that the
search for truth theory used by the Court to justify much free speech
doctrine, and in particular its broad tolerance for potentially dangerous
speech such as terrorist propaganda that could incite others to commit
violent acts, may contain questionable empirical assumptions about the
capacity for true ideas to triumph over false ones.4 If this is so, then we
might wish to think harder and more systematically about the costs and
benefits associated with a free speech principle that prefers a "better to risk
the danger than suppress the speech" approach, as opposed to one grounded
in the maxim that it is "better to be safe than sorry." 5
Next, Rod Smolla artfully traces the Court's twentieth century evolution
away from an early conception that there are inherently dangerous categories
of speech, towards the principle that sufficient harm from speech must be
demonstrated before it can be excised from the marketplace of ideas.6
Although Smolla focuses primarily on the categories of profane and libelous
speech, he teaches us that any attempt to move towards a more precautionary
approach to potentially dangerous speech-as Schauer argues might be
justified in some circumstances-could face resistance from this countertrend in modem free speech law.
Nadine Strossen wraps up this segment with a poignant reminder that
threats to free speech do not arise exclusively from challenges posed by

2. Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons from the Twentieth
Century, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 273 (2009).

3. Id. at 299.
4. Frederick Schauer, Is it Better to Be Safe than Sorry?: Free Speech and the Precautionary
Principle, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 301 (2009).

5. Id. at 307-313,325-331.
6. Rodney A. Smolla, Words "Which By Their Very Utterance Inflict Injury": The Evolving
Treatment of Inherently Dangerous Speech in Free Speech Law and Theory, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 317
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extremist groups, but can also emerge from disproportionate governmental
responses to those threats. 7 Strossen not only points to frequently made
complaints about excessive government secrecy and overly intrusive
surveillance programs, but also argues that the very branch of government
charged with protecting free speech rights, particularly in "pathological"
times,' is abdicating that duty by imposing undue procedural hurdles to
conducting substantive review of overreaching action by the Executive
Branch. 9 Resisting such government action or inaction, Strossen concludes,
is also vital to the enduring health of our democracy.' 0
Moving to the topic of campaign finance regulation, Sam Issacharoff
contributes an illuminating essay concerning the lack of a logical animating
principle underlying our current constitutional treatment of this issue.'1
Issacharoff describes how many major Western democracies create time
periods preceding elections that are heavily regulated to provide an equal
opportunity for different views to be expressed, and to prevent those with
greater financial means from overwhelming the electorate with campaign
propaganda. These systems contrast with that created in America by the
Court where, by equating free spending with free speech, it has essentially
guaranteed that election periods will be free-for-alls of campaign fundraising
and spending. It is curious if not illogical then, according to Issacharoff, that
recent major reform efforts in this country have moved towards the adoption
of a more regulated electioneering period without the constitutional
commitments to allow it to achieve the purposes for which it is normally
designed.
My essay follows in which I examine the extent to which the theory
relied on by the Court to justify its approach to assessing the
constitutionality of campaign finance regulation comports with the realities
of modem electioneering and new findings in political psychology regarding
the impact of electoral communications on voter decision making. 12 I argue
that the Court's theory and attendant doctrine bear little resemblance to what

7. Nadine Strossen, The Regulation of Extremist Speech in the Era of Mass Digital
Communications: Is Brandenburg Tolerance Obsolete in the Terrorist Era?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 361

(2009).
8. Stone, supra note 2 at 278.
9. See Strossen, supra note 7, at 364-365.
10.

Seeidat372.
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Samuel Issacharoff, The Constitutional Logic of Campaign Finance Regulation, 36 PEPP. L.

REV. 373 (2009).
12.

Barry P. McDonald, Campaign Finance Regulation and the Marketplace of Emotions, 36
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actually occurs on the ground in modem elections, both in terms of the
nature of electoral communications and the way in which they influence
voter decisions. A more accurate constitutional model would, I conclude,
justify greater regulatory oversight of election-related fundraising and
spending. In contrast to Issacharoff and me, Lillian BeVier is more sanguine
about the Court's approach in this area.13 Indeed, she makes a rousing
defense of it based on the notion that those challenging freedom, and
particularly the freedom to raise funds and spend them in connection with
political campaigns, bear the burden of showing that constraints on those
liberties can be justified. In her view, critics of the Court in this area and
proponents of electoral reform have failed to meet that burden.
Lastly (but certainly not least), Jack Balkin and Scot Powe explore free
speech and press issues arising out of our world's transition to digital
platforms of communication. Balkin makes a powerful argument that the
furtherance of free speech values and goals in the future will have less to do
with the Court and the First Amendment law it makes, and more to do with
the legislative, regulatory, and technological decisions our society makes. 14
Hence, Balkin suggests, we need to take great care that in fashioning the
knowledge and information policy that will be the product of these
decisions, they continue to promote traditional free expression goals and
values such as "the promotion and dissemination of knowledge and
opinion." 5
We are pleased that Scot Powe then comes out of retirement on mass
media law analysis to ask whether Geof Stone's commendation of the
Court's twentieth century free speech work product is altogether justified, at
least in the area of broadcast regulation. In a playful but pointed romp
through the Court's Red Lion and Pacifica decisions, Powe answers an
emphatic "no."' 1 6

Among other things, he argues that neither spectrum

scarcity nor signal pervasiveness could justify the Court's decisions to
accord broadcast media less than full free speech protection, which becomes
even more apparent as we head further into the digital age.
We are fortunate to have assembled such an eminent group of experts to
discuss these major issues of free expression in the modem age. Although
we recognize these questions cannot be fully answered here, we hope this
collection of articles and essays will provide a good trailhead for future
expeditions that will surely follow to revisit them.

13. Lillian R. BeVier, Can Freedom of Speech Bear the Twenty-First Century's Weight?, 36
PEPP. L. REv.415 (2009).
14. Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 427
(2009).
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16. L.A. Powe, Jr., Red Lion and Pacifica: Are the)' Relics?, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 445 (2009).

